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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—-000O000—-

ROBIN L. MICHAEL
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
RODNEY C. MICHAEL,

Case No. 950146-CA
Priority No. 4

Defendant/Appellee.
-—000O000-

BREF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) of The Utah Code and Rules 3 and 4 of The Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the failure of the Appellant, Robin L. Michael (hereinafter

Robin") to properly marshal the evidence which supports the decision of the trial
court in this matter preclude this Court from granting the relief requested? The
standard of review is that proper marshaling of the evidence is a precondition to
appellate review of a challenge to a trial court's decision. Crockett v. Crockett,
836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992).
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Further:
" . . . we will not reverse the findings of fact of a tried court sitting without a
jury unless they are '"against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making
them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); cf. State v.
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah 1994)."
MacKavv. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995).
2.

Did the trial court, applying legally appropriate criteria, properly

dismiss Robin's Petition to modify an award of custody based on her failure to
present sufficient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances? This
decision is subject to the standard of review that:
"Trial courts are given broad discretion in making child custody awards."
Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992). "The trial court's
decision regarding custody will not be upset 'absent (a showing of an
abuse of discretion or manifest injustice.'" Id. (quoting Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). '"We give great deference
to the trial court's findings of fact and do not overturn them unless they are
clearly erroneous.'" Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 1989).
'"However, to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts
and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate
findings and conclusions." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, at 923-924 (Utah
App. 1992). (Quoting Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App.
1988)."
Tucker v. Tucker. 881 P.2d948, 951 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE

1.

Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated:

(3) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for . . . the custody
of children....

2

2.

Section 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated:

(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are
separated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor
children as it considers appropriate. In determining custody, the
court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the
children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed
desires are not controlling and the court may determine the
children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding the custody, the court shall consider, among
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to
act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the child
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the
child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party,
it shall take that evidence into consideration in determining whether to
award custody to the other parent.
3.

Rule 4-903 of The Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
Intent:
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation of
custody evaluations.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1)
Custody evaluations shall be performed by
persons with the following minimum qualifications:
(A)
Social work evaluations shall be
performed by social workers licensed by the state in
which they practice.
3

(B)
Psychological evaluations shall b e
performed by psychologists licensed by the state in
which they practice.
(C)
Psychiatric examinations shall b e
performed by a licensed physician with a specialty in
psychiatry.
(2)
In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the evaluation
on both parties and shall submit a written report to the court, unless
one of the prospective custodians resides outside of the jurisdiction
of the court. In those cases, two individual evaluators may b e
appointed. The evaluators must confer prior to the commencement
of the evaluation to establish appropriate guidelines a n d criteria
and shall submit only one joint report to the Court.
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to e a c h of the
following factors:
(A)

the child's preference;

(B)

the benefit of keeping siblings together;

(C)

the relative strength of the child's bond with one or
both of the prospective custodians;

(D)

the general interest in continuing previously
determined custody arrangements where the child is
happy and well adjusted;

(E)

factors relating to the prospective custodians'
character or status or their capacity or
willingness to function a s parents, including:
(i)

moral character and emotional
stability;

(ii)

duration and depth of desire for
custody;

(iii)

ability to provide personal rather than
surrogate care;
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(F)

(iv)

significant impairment of ability to function as a
parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking
or other causes;

(v)

reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past;

(vi)

religious compatibility with the child;

(vii)

kinship, including in extraordinary
circumstances stepparent status;

(viii)

financial condition; and

(ix)

evidence of abuse of the subject child, another
child, or spouse; and

any other factors deemed important by the evaluator,
the parties, or the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee Rodney C. Michael (hereinafter "Rod") accepts Robin's Statement
of the Case but not Robin's Statement of Facts. Rather than fully restate the facts
as seen by Rod, he will supplement the Statement of Facts submitted by Robin and
accept all those paragraphs not so supplemented or challenged.

For the

convenience of this Court, Rod will follow the format of Robin.
Rod accepts paragraphs 1 through 3 of Robin's Statement of Facts as true.
Rod accepts Robin's Statement of Facts paragraph 4, but asserts that in
addition to those paragraphs of the Colorado Decree recited by Robin for this
Court in paragraph 4 of her Statement of Facts (Robin restated paragraphs 13, 19,
20 and 22), this Court, in order to be fully advised, should consider the following
additional paragraphs:
5

"11. The Court finds that C.R.S. 14-10-124 and 14-10-123.5 are both
applicable. The Court is to determine custody in the best interests of the
children.
" 12. The Court finds that the best interests of the children is served by the
parties having joint legal custody of both children, with the primary physical
custody of both children with the Petitioner.
"14. The Court also finds that both parties have used poor judgment in the
past which has had an adverse impact on the children. The Petitioner on
one occasion over reacted with respect to the discipline of another child of
the Respondent to the point that the discipline was abusive. The
Respondent's decision to take the children and hide for a period of time
was not appropriate.
"15. The Court also finds that on occasion both parties have made career
decisions that indicated a priority for their career over their children. Those
decisions, however, do not reflect on either party's parenting ability.
" 16.

The Court therefore has determined custody primarily on two factors.

" 17. The first of these factors is that these children are relatively young
and that they had a number of unsettling events in their life. These include
the fact that they were separated from their mother at an early age, that the
Respondent took the children from Missouri, and the Petitioner's recent
move with the cljildren to Salt Lake City. The Court determines that it would
be inappropriate to modify the children's present situation in that it would
simply be one more unsettling event to which they would need to adjust.
" 18. The second of these factors is that the children appear to be doing
well in the current situation. They are generally happy and well adjusted
under the physical custody of the Petitioner. If the Court continues the
physical custody with Petitioner, there is assurance that the children will
continue to do well. If the Court were to change physical custody, there
would be uncertainty as to how the children would do.
"21. The Court is also concerned about the substantial amount of distrust
between the parties.
Such distrust is not conducive to good
communications between the parties. The Court hopes that the entry of
final orders will assist the parties with regard to this issue"
(R. 7-11).
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Rod accepts paragraphs 5 through 14 of Robin's Statement of Facts.
Paragraph 15 of Robin's Statement of Facts (page 11 of Robin's Brief)
states:
"Dr. Sanders reinterviewed the children and prepared a supplemental
report stating that physical custody of at least the minor child Schuyler,
should be awarded to the mother on a trial basis."
That statement is not true. The recommendation in summary form is contained
within Dr. Jill Sanders' supplemental report dated July 10, 1994 (trial Exhibit 2, a
copy is attached to Robin's Brief as Appendix 4).

That report states in

paragraph 11:
"11. If the court, after hearing the evidence presented, decides to
honor Schuyler's preference, I recommend the following:
1.

Extend Schuyler's summer visitation. Re-evaluate his
adjustment and preference on or before August 20th.

2.

If at that time his preference to live with mother
remains, extend visitation through December, 1994,
and re-evaluate at that time.

3.

If Schuyler stays with mother through December, she
must have him in bi-monthly therapy to help monitor
his adjustment.

4.

Ashleigh returns to Wisconsin as scheduled. If custody
of Schuyler is changed at some future date, then the
pros and cons of splitting this sibling unit will need to
be addressed.

5.

I am strongly opposed to a permanent change of
custody for either child at this point in time" (emphasis
added).

7

In addition, Dr. Sanders declared several times in her testimony that in her
opinion there should be no change of legal custody (R. 892, 900). In response to
a question from the court, she also declared that the proposal for more time with
Robin would be in the best interest of Schuyler, not a change of circumstances
(R. 987-88).
Finally, Robin asserts in paragraph 15 of her Findings of Facts that Schuyler
was certain to experience harm if he were to be returned to the custody of Rod
(p. 12). That is untrue and there is no record cite to support this asserted "fact"
because support for this assertion does not exist. An examination of Dr. Sanders'
testimony demonstrates the fallacy of this claim.
Robin, in paragraph 16 of her Statement of Facts, excerpts testimony from
the tried by Dr. Sanders (R. 888-89) but does not include the relevant testimony thcrt
immedicrtely follows the testimony quoted in Robin's brief:
"Q. What are the risks of doing the other? Are there risks letting
him live out his fantasy?
"A.
I think absolutely there are. The first risk, which is pretty ~
again a pretty predictable thing, is that, you know, probably life is not going
to be massively better with mom. Mom is a lot of fun, she's very active,
she's very spontaneous, but the reality of life for an eight year old kid is that
you get up in the morning, your mom or your dad fixes you breakfast, they
get you ready for school, you go to school, you come home from school, you
do your homework, maybe you practice your piano, maybe you go to
soccer practice, you play for half an hour, your mom or dad makes dinner,
you eat dinner, you take a bath, and you go to bed. And it doesn't matter parenting sometimes doesn't influence that routine very much. So
Schuyler's life I think is going to be very similar if he lives with his mother
as it is with his father. And when his [sic] realizes that, I think there's a big
dose of disappointment for children when they realize that their fantasy
wasn't really true in the sense that it was going to be a much better life with
8

mom. Some things might be better, and some things might by [sic] worse,
but the degree to which he's fantasized it is going to be better will certainly
not materialize. That dispointment [sic] could certainly lead to anger
toward mom, resentment toward mom, acting out behavior in that
placement as well. So the disappointment that the fantasy doesn't come
true is probably the first primary and very predictable risk.
The second risk is that Skye is a loving child. He has a very big
heart. He loves both of his parents, and I cannot imagine that if this child
lives with his mother he will not experience considerable guilt about leaving
his father. So psychologically, I think that's a difficult thing for an eight year
old to manage. Those would be the risks on both sides"
(R. 889-91).
Rod accepts paragraphs 17 through 19 of Robin's Statement of Facts.
Rod questions the asserted statement of fact in paragraph 20 of Robin's
Statement of Facts. Thooe facts are best stated in the words of Dr. Sanders
herself:
Q.

Do you have a recommendation for this new situation for the Court?

A.

I do.

Q.

Would you describe it?

A.
Yes. Before I present it, I'd like the Court to know that I understand
that what I'm going to recommend is not the most expedient
recommendation, if I could put it that way. But it is what I think is the most
appropriate recommendation under the circumstances. First of all, I'd
recommend that Schuyler be allowed to stay with his mother for the rest of
the summer, and that he be re-interviewed, and reevaluated toward the end
of the summer, probably by or before August 20th, something like that,
regarding his adjustment, and his preference at that point in time, and that
no legal change of custody occur, but that he be allowed to extend his
visitation with his mother. That if his preference to stay with his mom
remains at that point in time, that either -- I don't know what the legal
designation would be, but that he be allowed to continue to reside with his
mother until December of '94, which is a natural - I mean, it's Christmas,
it's when school - it's a semester of school in most places, there's a long
9

break there, it's a reiativly [sic] natural point at which to re-assess this. And
then what - the benefit of that, I believe, is that at that point in time we
would have some data for — b e c a u s e he would have resided with his
mother for a fairly significant period of time, we'd have some d a t a about
how he feels about not being with Rod and Cynthia. I think it's information
that I don't have, no one has at this point in time. So my recommendation
would b e to do it in a graduated re-evaluation sort of sense. And then, you
know, if Schuyler in December continues to say, absolutely, I want to live
with my mom, and is doing well, has adjusted, does well in school, then I
think the timeframe -- that is the timing to look at a permanent custodial
change. I'm - 1 would be professionally opposed to a permanent change
at this point in time, because again, it's so based on his own fantasy that
hasn't had a chance to be lived out.
My other - two other
recommendations would b e that Ashleigh return to Wisconsin a s
scheduled, which I believe is at the end of this week. Though that m e a n s
these children a r e separated, there's some advantage to that. Number
one, it allows Schuyler to know what living without any siblings is like, and
to have some sort of experience with that. It allows Ashleigh to experience
that a s well. It allows Schuyler to b e kind of the focus of attention, which
m a y b e in large part is what he really n e e d s right now. The other
recommendation is that if Schuyler remains with his mother through
December, I would strongly recommend that he b e in therapy on at least
a bi-monthly basis with another therapist who could help to monitor his
adjustment, and monitor his preference
(R. 891-93) (emphasis added).

0,
And finally, coming back to the record that you recommended, it's
my understanding then that your ~ despite the c h a n g e in Schuyler's
approach, attitude, or choice, or moving away from neutrality, you're not
changing your recommendation, you believe that joint legal custody should
continue, and physical custody should b e with Rod Michael?
A.
Correct. That I am still confident of my original recommendation.
Again, the only thing that's changed is Schuyler's preference, a n d how that
c h a n g e s my recommendation that I think it's very important that we pay
attention to that change in preference, and psychologically give it a c h a n c e
to work itself out in a way that does him no long lasting harm"
(R. 900).
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and 20 fully describe her position. The statements in paragraph 21 as set out by
Robin are too constricted and ignore relevant testimony contrary to her position.
Rod accepts paragraphs 22 through 25 of Robin's Statement of Facts.
Robin's Statement of Facts paragraph 26 recites those Findings which
Robin asserts deal with the specifics of the change in circumstances alleged by
Robin and on which evidence was presented at the trial. Rod would assert that
this is underinclusive and fails to recite or designate the evidence which supports
the decision of the trial court. In reality, Findings of Facts paragraph numbers 3
(R. 728), 7 (R. 729), 8 (R. 729-730), 13 (R. 731), 21 (R. 735), 23 (R. 736-37), 24 (R. 737),
25 (R. 737), 26 (R. 737-38), 27 (R. 738), 30 (R. 739-40), 31 (R. 740-42) and 33 (R. 742)
present all of the findings of the trial court relevant to the issue presented by Robin
to this Court in her appeal. For the convenience of the Court, these specific
findings are attached hereto as Appendix A with citations to the Record that
support each finding. Further, those record cites will be referred to in the body of
Rod's argument itself.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
AFTER CONSIDERING THE FACTORS REQUIRED BY THE
GOVERNING LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE HANSON
PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ROBIN HAD FAILED TO PRESENT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY RECONSIDERING AN AWARD OF
CUSTODY WHICH WAS INITIALLY MADE AFTER A CONTESTED
TRIAL ON THE CUSTODY ISSUE AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION OF ROBIN

11

1.

Robin fails to marshall the evidence supporting the findings of the

trial court and thus fails to properly present her appeal to this Court. This failure
precludes this Court from granting the relief requested. Crockett v. Crockett, 836
P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah
App. 1991).
2.

The Utah Supreme Court in Hmerv. Elmer, 776 R2d 599, 603 (Utah

1989) and this Court Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 160 (Utah App. 1989),
articulated the rule of law that when custody has been awarded after a trial on
that issue, any petition to modify the resulting decree must overcome a high
threshold to show a substantial change in circumstances to justify a modification.
This standard protects the child from "ping pong" custody awards. In the instant
case, while Robin filed a petition asserting thirteen alleged bases for a change in
custody (see Robin's Brief paragraph 9 pages 7-9 (R. 172-182)), only the failure of
the court to honor the articulated preference of an eight-year-old boy is asserted
as a basis for the court's abuse of discretion in denying and dismissing her
petition. The custody evaluator appointed by the court recommended against a
change of custody. She opined that the stated preference of the child was based
on fantasy. Under these facts, the trial court properly applied the decision of this
Court in Cummings v. Cinnmings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) and rejected
Robin's claim which failed as a matter of law to constitute a substantial change
of circumstances. This is particularly true when none of the findings of the trial
court in support of its decision are properly challenged in this appeal. The sole
12

challenge of Robin is a claimed abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to
honor the fantasy of an eight-year-old child.
ARGUMENT
I.

ROBIN FAILS TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN
PRESENTING HER APPEAL TO THE COURT AND HER
APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED

This Court has articulated the following test for appellants challenging
factual findings of a trial court:
In challenging Findings, the Appellant:
must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts as
found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings of fact. If the Appellant fails to marshall the
evidence, the appellate court assumes the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of
law and the application of that law in the case.
Saunders v.Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). Peterson, 818
P.2d at 1308. An examination of Robin's brief demonstrates that none of the trial
court's findings of fact are properly challenged. While the Court is cited to
portions of the Record that Robin believes support her challenge, no effort is made
to show all of the relevant facts presented in the trial court, much less is there an
attempt to properly challenge any of the factual findings of the court. Robin simply
states that the court erred in its exercise of its discretion.
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The marshaling rule was adopted so that there would b e an understanding
by both the appellee and the Appellate Court as to what evidence exists in support
of a ruling by the tried court. This is required so that the Appellate Court is not put
in the position of simply retrying the case without seeing or hearing the witnesses.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in a similar case, Nilson v. Nilson:
" . . . this court is reluctant to reconsider evidence that a trial court is
in an advantaged position to weigh. Our removal from the
participants in a trial puts us in the disadvantaged position of
reviewing testimony from a cold record. On review, we cannot judge
the intonation of voice, or the manner and demeanor of witnesses a s
the trial judge is able to do."
652 P.2d 1323, 1324-1324 (Utah 1982).1 Robin has simply attempted to retry a n d reargue the matter to this Court.

Rather than marshaling the evidence that

supported the trial court's conclusion, she has downplayed it or m a d e it difficult
to find. By arguing the evidence that was not accepted by the trial court, she asks
this Court to reject the findings of the trial court without marshaling the evidence
which supports those findings. She only presents that evidence which is contrary
to the challenged ruling. This is a procedure which this Court h a s unequivocally
ruled is inappropriate. In doing so, Robin has failed to properly present her
appeal and this Court should "assumef] that the record supports the findings of the

1

See also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1994):
Callahan does not properly attack the findings of the trial court on that issue. He
attempts to draw our attention to the testimony of witnesses, which tends to be
contrary to the findings, and he conveniently ignores the testimony of witnesses
that support the findings. Callahan ignores his affirmative duty to properly attack
the findings by marshaling the evidence. Because of Callahan's failure to marshal
the evidence, we assume the record supports the findings of the trial court.
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trial court . . ." Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 876 P.2d 890, 894
(Utah App. 1994) and based thereon, that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in its ruling.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED APPROPRIATELY AND
WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE
PETITION OF ROBIN, WHO FAILED TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF A MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING REOPENING OF THE
CUSTODY QUESTION

If this Court overlooks the procedural defect of Robin's failure to properly
marshcdl the facts in support of the trial court's determination, the decision of the
court is appropriately based on findings which are supported by ample evidence
in the record. Rod has set forth in the Appendix to this brief each of the findings
which he believes supports the ruling of the court. Rod has in effect carried
Robin's burden of marshaling the facts. His effort in doing so should not be seen
as anything more than as an attempt to aid the Court. None of these findings are
challenged by Robin in her brief. In addition to presenting each of these findings,
Rod has set forth citations to the record which support each of the findings which
the court has entered. Judge Hanson has thus entered findings that fully support
his decision which are not challenged by Robin. Consequently, Robin's appeal
should be rejected by this Court.
Turning to the merits of Robin's challenge, however, the trial court acted
appropriately in rejecting Robin's petition after hearing the evidence regarding
the claimed substantial change in circumstances. This Court, in Maughan v.
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Maughan, supra, and the Utah Supreme Court in Elmer v. Elmer, supra, ruled that
a petitioner alleging a change in circumstances to open a decree of divorce which
awarded custody after a trial regarding custody has a high burden of proof to
demonstrate a change of circumstance not envisioned in the original decree.
Elmer 776 P.2d at 603; Mauahan, 770 P.2d at 160. Robin failed to meet this burden
in the trial court.
In the case most analogous to this, Cummingsv. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,
473 (Utah App. 1991), this Court ruled that the desires of an eleven-year-old child
were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a substantial change of
circumstances. Here, Dr. Sanders testified that the only change of circumstance
she found was Schuyler's preference (R. 900) and that this change of preference
was based on fantasy, not reality (R. 871, 887, 899). She also testified that acting
on that fantasy could in fact be harmful and detrimental to the child (R. 889, 891).
However, that is not the sole factor supporting Judge Hanson's ruling. Unlike the
instant case, in Cummings the custody evaluator recommended that there be a
change in custody. Here, the evaluator recommended no change of custody
(R. 892, 900).
This testimony was considered carefully by the trial court, discussed by
Judge Hanson in his Memorandum Decision and then evaluated and articulated
clearly in his Findings of Fact 23 which stated:
"Dr. Sanders recommended to the court that there not be a change
in the custody Order in her original report to the court. Despite the fact that
Schuyler in his interview just before trial with Dr. Sanders was very strong
16

in stating that he desired to live with his mother, she felt that no change in
custody should occur. The original findings and recommendations to the
court by Dr. Sanders were very similar to that presented to the Colorado
court by Dr. Mary Hansen, who recommended that physical custody of the
children be placed with the Defendant, Rod Michael. Dr. Sanders noted
that her original recommendation had been based on the Defendant's
more consistent desire for primary care, the children were adjusting and
doing well in his care, and there was no reason to disrupt a previously
determined long-standing custodial arrangement. The only change that
Dr. Sanders found was Schuyler's preference in her last interview with the
children. This preference was not adamantly stated by Schuyler when he
appeared before the court to express his own desires to the court in
chambers as Dr. Sanders described them in his statements to her. This
expressed preference occurred after spending 6 weeks with his mother,
Robin Clink, the Plaintiff who did not permit contact with Rod Michael, until
after Schuyler had seen Dr. Sanders. There had been no change in
Ashleigh. Dr. Sanders related to the court that she believed this preference
was not based on reality, it was based on fantasy which though based upon
a true attachment for his mother, was a fantasy about a better life with his
mother because he spends play times, that is unstructured time away from
school with his mother while he spends structured school and work time
with his father. He has had continuing discussions with his mother about
change of custody while the Defendant will not discuss changing custody
or custody issues with Schuyler. Schuyler sees life with his mother as being
life in Missouri where he has always gone to play and which he views as a
sanctuary with his grandparents that removes him from the dispute
between his parents over his custody and he would move from being the
oldest child in a three-child family (Cynthia and Rod Michael have had a
child born of their marriage, Jake, who was born on March 31, 1993) to the
younger of two children if he lived with his mother. The court finds that the
evidence supports the findings and recommendations of Dr. Sanders and
they are adopted as the findings of the court on these points"
(R. 736-37).
In addition to accepting Dr. Sanders' determination that Schuyler's
preference was based on fantasy, the court also specifically found the implied
additional ground of "physical abuse toward Schuyler in his home" (Robin's Brief
p. 25) was simply not true.
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Finding of Fact 21 stated:
"Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in the
children's lives, is a positive factor. Cynthia Michael is able to assist her
husband, the Defendant, in meeting the children's daily needs. Cynthia
Michael has not attempted to act inappropriately towards the children and
evidence suggesting to the contrary is not persuasive. Defendant's present
wife has not attempted to replace the Plaintiff as the children's mother any
more than the Plaintiff's present husband has attempted to take the place
of the Defendant as the children's father. The court notes that Schuyler's
testimony in chambers did not rise to the level claimed as to negative
feelings about the Defendant's present wife, Cynthia Michael and to the
extent it was negative, Schuyler was animated and used language
uncharacteristic of a child of the age and maturity of Schuyler. The court
believes that Schuyler's statements regarding his stepmother may have
been implanted, hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the Plaintiff's
interests in mind. The children, whether with the Plaintiff or the Defendant,
are in a better position, having contact with a stepparent, especially an
appropriate stepparent, than the children would be in a day care or
spending time when not with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, with a person
who would constitute a "legal" stranger. To the extent that the Defendant's
remarriage has been a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive
change in the Defendant's household and not a basis to find a change of
circumstances for the purposes of considering a change of custody."
Finding of Fact 24:
"The allegations that he is being "abused" (Schuyler's term) by his
stepmother is not supported by the believable evidence"
(R. 735).
In reality, without challenging the findings of the court, Robin seeks to have
this Court find that the tried court abused its discretion by presenting only the facts
that supported her contentions rather than those facts which supported the
findings of the court. As discussed supra, this Court must reject that approach
both as a matter of law, Cummings, and fact (Appelee's Brief, Point I, supra at
13-15).
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Turning to the analysis of the legal issues presented, this Court in
Cummingsv. Cummings, stated:
"We note, however, that where the tried court does not bifurcate, it still must
conduct a separate analysis and make separate findings as to substantial
change in circumstances. Only if a substantial change of circumstances
is found should the trial court consider whether a change of custody is
appropriate, given the child's best interests."
821 P.2d472at475(UtahApp. 1991). This was the procedure followed by Judge
Hanson, who, after hearing the evidence on change of circumstance, determined
that a change of circumstance had not been established. He specifically found
that the parties were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in Jefferson County,
Colorado, after a two-day tried over custody of the minor children (Findings of Fact
number 3, R. 728) and that because this particular petition alleging change of
circumstances was presented to the trial court after an initial trial on the issue of
custody, the standard of showing the change in circumstances was the highest
possible standard (Finding of Fact number 8, R. 729-30). He found that Robin
failed to produce the required evidence of changed circumstances. As the Court
went on to note:
"The parties have, for all intents and purposes, been involved in ongoing litigation regarding the Colorado Custody Order since it was
entered"
(Finding of Fact number 13, R. 731).
Again, turning to the standards articulated by this Court in Cummings:
"The asserted change [in circumstances] must . . . have some
material relationship to and substantial effect on parenting ability or the
functioning of the presently existing custodial relationship. In the absence
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of an indication that the change has or will have such an effect, the
materiality requirement is not met." Becker, 694 P.2d at 610. Also, "only
changes not contemplated by the parties at the time of divorce are relevant
to the substantial change test."
821 P.2d 472 at 476-76. The only change which Robin asserts the trial court erred
in failing to consider was the effect of an eight-year-old child's preference based
on fantasy. None of the court's findings in support of its decision are challenged just its conclusion.
Most relevantly to this appeal, this Court declared:
"We also take exception with the trial court's heavy reliance on its
conversation with Jay and his statement that he preferred to live with his
father. It was inappropriate for the court to given an eleven-year-old boy
such control. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1) 1989 states that a child's
preference as to whom he or she wishes to live may be considered but is
not controlling. A child's preference is only one of several factors to be
considered and is not binding on the trial court. Paryzek, 776 P.2d at 81;
Bakev. Bake, 772 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah App. 1989)."
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 at 479. The instant case is just such a
situation. The only issue asserted to this Court was the change of Schuyler's
opinion from neutrality to desire to live with Robin. This change, however, as is
clear from Dr. Sanders' testimony, is pure fantasy.
The implication raised by Robin that the stepmother, Cynthia Michael, was
in any sense abusive was also rejected by the trial court.
Again, Robin makes no challenge to these findings which, as can be seen
from record citations set forth in Appendix A to this brief, are fully supported in the
record. The only abuse of discretion asserted by Robin is the trial court's not
accepting the change of preference of a child based on fantasy. The court
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appropriately rejected that as a basis for finding of a substantial change in
circumstances and declined to hear evidence on the best interest of the child.
Not addressed in her Brief by Appellant is the additional finding by the trial
court that Schuyler had been manipulated prior to trial. He spent six weeks with
his mother prior to being seen immediately before tried by Dr. Sanders. Robin
refused to allow Schuyler to see his father until after he had seen Dr. Sanders
despite the tried court's warning to her counsel that such an action would be
considered if it occurred (Findings of Facts numbers 26 and 27, R. 737-38).
In support of her appeal, Robin cites this Court to the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams, 655 P.2d 652 (Utah 1982). Examination of
that decision demonstrates that it supports the tried court, not Robin. The Utah
Supreme Court (655 P.2d at 652-53) determined that the trial court properly utilized
the bifurcated test of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) as there had been
a substantial change in circumstances established. In the instant case, Robin
seeks review of the decision of the tried court that no substantial change in
circumstances had occurred. Factually, in Williams, the trial court's findings were
that two sons, ages ten and seven, had developed a distinct antipathy for their
mother coid special affection for their father (655 P.2d at 653). Both of these boys
requested that they be permitted to reside with their father. The trial court's
examination revealed that these wishes were based on reality, not fantasy. In the
instccnt matter, the only change in circumstance was that of an eight-year-old boy
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desiring to live with his mother, a wish that the evaluating psychologist felt was
fantasy, not the reality that existed in the Williams case.
In considering the question Robin asserts to this Court, Robin quoted the
Supreme Court's declaration that:
"Such preferences are properly considered by the tried court in determining
future custody, although they are not necessarily controlling. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 30-3-10; Bushellv. BushelL Utah, 649 R2d 85 (1982)."
Williams, 655 P.2d at 653. In the Bushell decision, the Supreme Court held the trial
court appropriately rejected the wishes of a twelve-year-old to be with his father
who did not properly discipline him and in fact allowed him to indulge in
inappropriate behaviors while the mother was the disciplinarian who was
imparting socially appropriate standards. In neither Bushell nor Williams was any
evaluation made as to whether or not the expressed preference of the child was
based on reality. Implicit in the facts of each are that in Williams the children
expressed a preference based on a reality arising from changes that had
occurred in the lives of each of their parents. In Bushell the court would not
accept an inappropriate preference by a child, just as Judge Hanson refused in
the instant matter.
Robin next refers this Court to Mitchell v. Mitchell 668 P.2d 561 (Utah 1983).
However, that decision also falls within the parameters discussed above. One of
the children had bonded strongly to her father after living with him for a year and
a half. The court noted that the trial court had evidence from four mental health
experts who offered conflicting opinions.
opinions were presented to Judge Hanson.
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Here no conflicting professional

Factually and legally, Mitchell is distinguishable from the instant matter.
In Mitchell the trial court found a clear change of circumstances which the
Supreme Court affirmed. 668 P.2d at 564. Factually, not one of the four mental
health experts who examined the children made any finding that their preferences
were based on fantasy - a factor which was critical for Dr. Sanders and Judge
Hanson in the instant case.
Finally, Robin refers this Court to Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d
504 (Utah 1970), admittedly a pre Hogge decision. In examining the factors
involved in the preferences of the children, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that where one child said he wished to live with the father and the other wished to
live with the mother, "neither child can bind the cord by indicating a preference."
24 Utah 2d at 239, 469 P.2d at 506. The Court went on to examine the testimony of
the two clinical psychologists who had evaluated the children, one on behalf of
each parent, and determined that their findings were similar. There was no
finding by either of the mental health experts that the preferences of the children
were based on fantasy. The desires of one child were not honored. In addition,
there is the underlying factor that in the instant matter, there had been an initial
trial regarding custody in Colorado and the standard of proof required to reopen
the matter as pointed out above under Elmer and Maughan is a higher one than
existed when Wiese was decided.
While Robin cites the Court to the testimony of Dr. Sanders in regard to the
risk to Schuyler if a change of custody is not made, she ignores the testimony of
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the risk to Schuyler if it is made. Under such conflicting evidence, the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion and made the determination that there was
not a change of circumstances sufficient to reopen the custody issue. The court
appropriately applied the Hogge-Becker tests as mandated in Elmer and
Maughan. This Court should affirm those rulings.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

The request of attorney's fees for Robin at trial was denied (R. 744).
Rod requested attorney's fees in the court below. That request is currently
pending further information of the economic circumstances of Robin after she
moves to Missouri (R. 722-24, 768). This Court, accordingly, should, after affirming
the tried court, remand this case for consideration in the application for attorney's
fees of Rod, those fees and costs incurred by Rod in responding to this appeal.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The change in preference for custody by an eight-year-old boy which is
based on fantasy is not, as a mcrtter of law, a change of circumstance which would
permit the opening of a decree of divorce entered after trial on the issue of
custody. The tried court appropriately made that determination and rejected
implications thert the stepmother was in any way abusing the child. The trial court
determined that the allegations of abuse seem to have been planted by other
members of Robin's family. None of these findings are properly chcdlenged by
Robin, merely the determination of the court. Accordingly, this Court should affirm
the ruling of the tried court that a change of circumstances sufficient to permit the
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reopening of the decree of divorce in regard to custody has not been established
and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for consideration of an
award of attorney's fees with the reserved question of an award of attorney's fees
and the costs of Dr. Sanders, which is presently pending before the trial court for
determination after Robin's economic circumstances are made known to the trial
court.
DATED this 3JL day of August, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,

David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX A

3.

The parties were originally divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered July 1,

1991 in Jefferson County, Colorado after a two-day trial, April 24th and April 25th, 1991,
over the issue of custody of their minor children. After the trial, April 24 and April 25,
1991, the District Court for Jefferson County, State of Colorado, awarded joint legal
custody to the parties and placed physical custody of the children in the Defendant,
Rodney C. Michael. Prior to the entry of that Order, custody evaluations were performed
by Judith Jones Nuganis, MSW, filed in October of 1990 and by Dr. Mary Hansen, Ph.D.
filed on April 4, 1991. At the time of the trial in Colorado, both the Plaintiff and Defendant
were residing outside of Colorado. The Defendant resided in the State of Utah with the
children and the Plaintiff resided in California. Each resided outside the State of
Colorado because of employment requirements. (R. 728).

Authority: R. 7-11, 119-45, 185-90, 845, 1312

1

7.

The Colorado Decree awarded physical custody of the two minor children,

Schuyler born December 17, 1985, and Ashleigh, bom July 10, 1987 to the Defendant their
father, Rodney Michael, and awarded certain visitation rights to the Plaintiff. It awarded
joint legal custody to Plaintiff and Defendant so that each party would have access to
important information relating to the children's education, medical records and medical
providers as well as other information of interest to the parties as parents. As Schuyler
suffers from cerebral palsy, it was and is important that both parents be involved in
providing the appropriate physical therapy for him when residing with or visiting each
parent. (R. 729).

Authority: R. 7-11, 185-90, 845

2

8.

As the parties were divorced by a Colorado court on July 1, 1991, after a two-

day trial on the issue of custody and this proceeding followed, this court must view this
case as one where a custody determination made after a contested custody trial is under
challenge. This court is required by governing Utah law to look critically at the alleged
change of circumstances as opposed to a more relaxed standard that might be
applicable where a custody was awarded based on default or stipulation. A contested
custody determination relating to custody, is entitled to greater deference than a custody
determination made upon default or stipulation. (R. 729-30).

Authority: R. 7-11, 185-90, 845

3

13.

The parties have, for all intents and purposes been involved in on-going

litigation regarding the Colorado Custody Order since it was entered. (R. 731).

Authority: R. 845, 862, 1371, 1451

4

21.

Defendant's remarriage, rather than being a negative factor in the

children's lives, is a positive factor. Cynthia Michael is able to assist her husband, the
Defendant in meeting the children's daily needs. Cynthia Michael has not attempted to
act inappropriately towards the children and evidence suggesting to the contrary is not
persuasive. Defendant's present wife has not attempted to replace the Plaintiff as the
children's mother any more than the Plaintiffs present husband has attempted to take the
place of the Defendant as the children's father. The court notes that Schuyler's testimony
in chambers did not rise to the level claimed as to negative feelings about the
Defendant's present wife, Cynthia Michael and to the extent it was negative, Schuyler
was animated and used language uncharacteristic of a child of the age and maturity of
Schuyler. The court believes that Schuyler's statements regarding his stepmother may
have been implanted, hopefully inadvertently, by persons with the Plaintiff's interests in
mind. The children, whether with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, are in a better position,
having contact with a stepparent, especially an appropriate stepparent, than the children
would be in a daycare or spending time when not with the Plaintiff or the Defendant, with
a person who would constitute a "legal" stranger. To the extent that the Defendant's
remarriage has been a change in circumstances, it constitutes a positive change in the
Defendant's household and not a basis to find a change of circumstances for the
purposes of considering a change of custody. (R. 735).

Authority: 912, 1052-71, 1329-32, 1413-31, 1433-48, 1450-60
5

23.

Dr. Sanders recommended to the court that there not be a change in the

custody Order in her original report to the court. Despite the fact that Schuyler in his
interview just before trial with Dr. Sanders was very strong in stating that he desired to
live with his mother, she felt that no change in custody should occur. The original
findings and recommendations to the court by Dr. Sanders were very similar to that
presented to the Colorado court by Dr. Mary Hansen, who recommended that physical
custody of the children be placed with the Defendant, Rod Michael. Dr. Sanders noted
that her original recommendation had been based on the Defendant's more consistent
desire for primary care, the children were adjusting and doing well in his care, and there
was no reason to disrupt a previously determined long-standing custodial arrangement.
The only change that Dr. Sanders found was Schuyler's preference in her last interview
with the children. This preference was not as adamantly stated by Schuyler when he
appeared before the court to express his own desires to the court in chambers as Dr.
Sanders described them in his statements to her. This expressed preference occurred
after spending 6 weeks with his mother, Robin Clink, the Plaintiff who did not permit
contact with Rod Michael, until after Schuyler had seen Dr. Sanders. There had been no
change in Ashleigh. Dr. Sanders related to the court that she believed this preference
was not based on reality, it was based on fantasy which though based upon a true
attachment for his mother, was a fantasy about a better life with his mother because he
spends play times, that is unstructured time away from school with his mother while he
spends structured school and work time with his father.

He has had continuing

discussions with his mother about change of custody while the Defendant will not discuss
6

changing custody or custody issues with Schuyler. Schuyler sees life with his mother as
being life in Missouri where he has always gone to play and which he views as a
sanctuary with his grandparents that removes him from the dispute between his parents
over his custody and he would move from being the oldest child in a three child family
(Cynthia and Rod Michael have had a child born of their marriage, Jake, who was born
on March 31, 1993) to the younger of two children if he lived with his mother. The court
finds that the evidence supports the findings and recommendations of Dr. Sanders and
they are adopted as the findings of the court on these points. (R. 736-37).

Authority: R. 119-45, 850, 851, 853-56, 859-62, 863, 864, 865-93, 894, 900, 910-11, 941-48,
974,989-90, 1052-71, 1237-40, 1254-55, 1441, 1475-76

7

24.

The cdlegcrtions that he is being "abused" (Schuyler's term), by his

stepmother is not supported by the believable evidence. (R. 737).

8

25.

There is no sufficient change in circumstances that would allow this Petition

to proceed, based upon the Defendant's remarriage or the children's relationship with
their stepmother, Cynthia Michael. In fact, the evidence was and the court finds that the
children are happy, well adjusted and interact in a loving, happy relationship with
Defendant and Cynthia Michael and Defendant as he did before his marriage to Cynthia
Michael is very involved in caring for, interacting with, and raising his children. (R. 737).

Authority: R. 864-65, 925-26, 943-44, 952-53, 957-58, 1210-18, 1313-20, 1323-27, 1329-39,
1340-43, 1348-49, 1417-31, 1433-48, 1450-60, 1461-71

9

26.

At the final pretrial of this matter, counsel for the Defendant pointed out to

the court and counsel for the Plaintiff that the children would have spent approximately
6 weeks with the Plaintiff prior to tried and that it would be a good idea for the children to
again see Dr. Sanders, the court appointed psychologist, immediately prior to trial to see
if there had been any change in circumstance. To facilitate this evaluation, counsel for
the Defendant requested that the children be returned to the Defendant before that
meeting took place. The Plaintiff refused to do this. She permitted no contact between
the Defendant and Schuyler or Ashleigh before they saw Dr. Sanders, though counsel for
the Defendant attempted to arrange for Schuyler and Ashleigh to visit with the Defendant
before and be taken to that interview by the Defendant. (Exhibits 16-D and 20-D). (R. 73738).

Authority: R. 850, 982-83, 989-990, 1237-40, 1254-55, 1388

10

27.

The court advised counsel for the Plaintiff at the pretrial that if counsel for

the Defendant's request was not honored, the court would have to consider the fact that
Plaintiff would not agree to allow the children to see the Defendant before seeing Dr.
Sanders. Despite this statement, Plaintiff refused to permit the children to see their father
before seeing Dr. Sanders. (R. 738).

Authority: R. 990, 1237-40, 1254-55, 1268

11

30.

The Plaintiff alleges a change of circumstances based on Schuyler's

recently stated preference to live with the Plaintiff, and his stated reluctance to be with
his father. The court notes with some interest as did Dr. Sanders (the Court's designated
expert), that both children had continually maintained a neutral position regarding their
preference as to living location until Dr. Sanders' last interview, which was the day before
this hearing was scheduled to commence, when Schuyler asserted that he wanted to live
with his mother and effectively did not want anything to do with his father. It was further
reported by Dr. Sanders that Schuyler advised her that his stepmother "abused" him. Dr.
Sanders was unable to account for this sudden and drastic change from the "safe" and
neutral position adopted by Schuyler, except that she was of the opinion that Schuyler's
perception of life with his mother, the Plaintiff, and how that would be if he resided with
her was based upon fantasy and not reality. Dr. Sanders did not believe that the child
had been influenced by the Plaintiff. While Schuyler's announced change from a position
of refusing to state a preference to a strong preference towards residing with the Plaintiff
is certainly a change, unless the change is based upon reality, it has no basis and cannot
be considered a change for purposes of determining whether or not there has been a
significant change of circumstances. (R. 739-40).

Authority: R. 859-62, 863-93, 894, 900, 941-48
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31.

The following observations are relevant to the present stated position of

Schuyler. Schuyler had been with his mother for the six week period of time prior to the
hearing. Part of that time Schuyler has been with his maternal grandparents at their
farm in Missouri. The visitation periods at his grandparents in Missouri and with his
mother are clearly filled with fun activities and carefree times. There are no schedules,
no schoolwork, no lessons or athletic practice, no household chores or the like. All the
activities are geared towards having an enjoyable time, especially, things that are
enjoyable for a child the age of Schuyler. He has the opportunity to be involved with farm
animals, he is allowed to operate four-wheel off-road vehicles, participates in trips to
amusement parks. Those activities are surely enjoyable for Schuyler, and he is lucky to
have access to those activities with his mother, but they are not what would occur on a
long-term basis when school, children's household responsibilities, and the like must be
considered. To the extent that Schuyler's stated preference is based upon his activities
with his mother, the Plaintiff, and her extended family, those activities are not the reality
of what would occur on a day-in and day-out basis if he was with his mother, the Plaintiff,
full-time. The court determines such to be the case, even in the face of Plaintiff's attempts
to portray her lifestyle as being "laid back" and involving a lot of fun activities. The court
does not believe that the Plaintiff's normal lifestyle is such that it includes nonstop fun
activities for children. While the court has no evidence that Schuyler has been influenced
by the Plaintiff, some of his words and demeanor suggest that his statements may not be
his own. As indicated earlier, his statements in chambers were not as strong as those
made to Dr. Sanders and related by her during her testimony during the course of this
13

tried.

Finally, the court is concerned that the Plaintiffs extended family may be

influencing Schuyler. The court notes that the Plaintiffs mother, Arlene Wilcox, who
testified as a witness in this case, indicated among other things, that she had a poor
relationship with one of her other children, one of the Plaintiffs siblings, because she
(Arlene Wilcox) had intervened in a custody dispute between her son and his spouse.
The children have spent considerable time with their maternal grandmother, and she,
in view of her position, could certainly exercise considerable influence over them if she
chose to do so. As she indicated in the circumstance with her own son, the children's
grandmother, Ms. Wilcox, has chosen to be involved in some of her other grandchildren's
custody issues.
For all the foregoing reasons, the court does not believe that Schuyler's stated
desire to reside with his mother constitutes a significant or material!, or valid change of
circumstance. Further, even if the stated change of preference by Schuyler constituted
a material change of circumstances, that change in and of itself is insufficient to allow
this court to find a material chccnge of circumstances, on which to proceed on to the
question of best interests. The appellate courts of this state have clearly announced that
a child's stated change in preference, even when based in reality, is not sufficient in and
of itself to make a change of circumstances to meet the requirements of the first phase
in a petition to modify custody. (R. 740-42).

Authority: R. 850, 852, 865-93, 894, 900, 941, 994, 995-97, 1008, 1052-71
14

33.

The court finds that the minor children have resided with Defendant

throughout their lives. They remained with him when Plaintiff, prior to the filing of the
divorce action, moved to California to pursue her employment. The Defendant has
provided a stable home and environment for the children and the children have thrived
in the environment provided for them by the Defendant. The children have not resided
with the Plaintiff, except for visitation, since she left the marital home in Colorado to
accept a job promotion in California. (R. 742).

Authority: R. 855-58, 119-145, 922-23, 974, 1312-13, 1417-18
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